Going into the war in Iran, the Israeli government seemingly had two intertwined goals: to bring down the Islamic Republic and rid Israel of its Hezbollah problem.
The logic went that the Lebanese Shiite group, which has posed a persistent threat to Israel for 44 years, would finally succumb if stripped of its Iranian benefactor. After all, Israeli attempts to destroy Hezbollah through direct military action had not been effective, nor had internationally supported disarmament efforts.
But as the United States and Iran continue to negotiate over an agreement that might put an end to their war, the Israeli-Lebanese front remains as active as ever.
Israel has increased strikes and incursions deeper into Lebanon, while Hezbollah is targeting the Israeli military deployed in southern Lebanon and the civilian population in northern Israel.
Worse, from the Israeli government’s perspective, is that Iran has found a way of turning its survival and newfound leverage over the Strait of Hormuz into protecting Hezbollah.
Tehran is currently conditioning a potential deal with Washington on a complete halt of Israeli hostilities in Lebanon a move clearly designed to safeguard the political and military standing of Hezbollah, its primary proxy.
Since full-scale war returned to Lebanon on March 2, 2026, it has had a massive humanitarian cost. As of June 1, over a million Lebanese have been displaced and more than 3,300 killed since the beginning of March.
On the Israeli side, 24 soldiers and 4 civilians have been killed in the same time period.
Israel seeks to decouple its Lebanon front from the wider regional conflict, aiming to maintain its military campaign against the Shiite organization independently of broader U.S. negotiations with Iran.
But whether it can do this is uncertain. The Trump administration has largely excluded Israel from the specifics of its Iranian dialogue while attempting to restrict Israeli operations in Lebanon to strikes in the country’s south and the Bekaa Valley and prohibiting attacks on state infrastructure.
The ordering of attacks on Lebanon’s capital, Beirut, by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on June 1 lays bare the limits to U.S. pressure.
And ultimately, the resolution of this conflict rests upon how President Donald Trump chooses to navigate Iranian demands concerning the future of Lebanon.
As a historian of Israel and Lebanon, I have studied cycles of violence between these parties since 1982, and have noted recurring patterns in which Hezbollah has emerged emboldened, maintaining its dominance over Lebanese society as an Iranian proxy.
Contrary to Israeli hopes, Iran’s patronage of Hezbollah has not been ended by the Iran war. And to confound issues, continued Israeli occupation of Lebanese land could grant Hezbollah the necessary justification to sustain its narrative of resistance at the cost of the broader Lebanese population.
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A Wounded But Not Dead Hezbollah
While significantly weakened as a result of more than two and a half years of war with Israel, Hezbollah continues to wield considerable power in Lebanon.
After a ceasefire in November 2024 following the full-scale war in September-October of that year, fighting ostensibly stopped, a new Lebanese president was elected, and a new government was established in February 2025.
That ended a three-year political deadlock generated by Hezbollah’s effective veto power over successive Lebanese governments since 2008.
Even since the formation of a government in 2025, however, the Lebanese state has been unable to effectively make progress in disarming Hezbollah as stipulated in the November 2024 armistice agreement that ended that previous round of fighting.
Instead, Iran invested significant efforts to prop up its Lebanese proxy. Tehran even sent senior officers of its Revolutionary Guard soon after the November 2024 ceasefire to assume the command of the Shiite organization, which lost many of its leaders at the hands of Israeli assassinations and targeted strikes.
These efforts are paying off for Tehran now, as seen through Hezbollah’s ability to challenge Israel militarily.
With the beginning of this most recent war in March, the Lebanese prime minister banned Hezbollah’s operations, while the president condemned the group for dragging Lebanon into a conflict that most Lebanese rejected.
But, as in the past, the government has been unable to effectively rein in Hezbollah. A telling case came on March 24, 2026, when Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry declared the Iranian ambassador a persona non grata, ordering him to leave the country.
Iran and Hezbollah defied the order, and the ambassador refused to leave the embassy in Beirut.
This example also suggests that the hopes for revitalized state capacities after the current Lebanese government came to power in February 2025 the first government since 2008 not controlled by Hezbollah may have been premature.
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Gaza Via Lebanon
Employing what some have called a “Gaza model” in Lebanon, Israel has effectively created a new security zone in south Lebanon by occupying Lebanese territory, razing to the ground whole villages that Hezbollah had used for military purposes and clearing out most of the population from the area.
But Israel has occupied south Lebanon in the past: first in March 1978, during the Litani operation, and then again from 1982 to 2000. The failure of these occupations should raise alarms in Israel.
Neither resulted in lasting security improvements and instead left indelible, traumatic scars on Israel’s collective consciousness, creating the image of Lebanon as a quagmire into which Israel has been repeatedly drawn.
The government of Netanyahu is now leading the country into another potential quagmire in Lebanon.
The news about the Israel Defense Forces’ occupation of the Beaufort castle in south Lebanon on May 31 should bring grim memories for Israelis.
That castle remains entrenched in the collective memory of Israel’s occupation of south Lebanon in 1982-2000 as a symbol of its failure.
Netanyahu, however, packaged Israel’s occupation as a sign of strength, stating that “we have returned stronger than ever.” History suggests otherwise.
History Repeats Itself
Netanyahu is driven in large part by Israeli domestic affairs.
A majority of Israelis support the continuation of the war against Hezbollah. Moreover, with national elections scheduled for October 2026, Netanyahu needs to show some success in at least one of the multiple military fronts he has intentionally kept open since the Hamas attack on Oct. 7, 2023.
With Netanyahu seemingly failing to achieve his aims in Iran, Lebanon and Hezbollah provide him with an opportunity to keep a state of emergency in Israel, which he needs for his own political survival.
But failure in Iran makes achieving Netanyahu’s goal in Lebanon that much harder. The government in Tehran seems to have found significant leverage over the U.S. and Israel.
And under these conditions, Tehran would not give up on Hezbollah, which remains its most important regional asset.
Diplomacy is the only way out of this imbroglio. And while it would not likely lead to the disarming of Hezbollah and to the Israel’s full withdrawal from south Lebanon, it remains the only constructive way forward.
At the behest of the Trump administration, Israeli and Lebanese ambassadors met to discuss a diplomatic understanding between two countries that have never had official relations.
And on May 30, military representatives of the two countries met in Washington, D.C.
For the first time since 1983, the Lebanese government has agreed to negotiate directly with Israel over a long-term political agreement, including the possibility of finally demarcating their shared borders.
Hezbollah, as expected, has vehemently opposed these negotiations.
What we are seeing currently unfolding in Lebanon is another testament to the failure of the Israeli-U.S. war against Iran. Yet a war that began with lofty promises of a new Middle East may end up with a worse version of the old Middle East an emboldened Islamic Republic, a new Israeli occupation of south Lebanon, and a Hezbollah, while weaker than before, still entrenched as an armed militia outside of Lebanese state control and working in concert with Iran.
Asher Kaufman, Professor of History and Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
